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espite the well-established and widespread 
assumption within contemporary analytic philosophy 
that ethics and aesthetics are fundamentally different 
disciplines with distinct concerns, there is a long and rich 
history within the broader Western tradition that treats them 
as closely related and mutually reinforcing. This can be 
seen, for example, in Plato’s equation of the beautiful and 
the good in the Symposium, as well as in the Greek notion 
of kalokagathia (the beautiful-and-good). Plotinus pushes 
this idea further in his Enneads by introducing the notion of 
the beautiful soul, which Enlightenment philosophers 
discussed widely.1 And even within the analytic tradition, 
the links between the two areas of concern have not gone 
unexplored. Aestheticians, for example, have written 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Robert E. Norton, The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic 
Morality in the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995). 
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extensively on such questions as whether moral defects or 
virtues of artworks affect their aesthetic value and whether 
artworks can be morally edifying/corrupting. Some 
ethicists have considered the implications of recent brain 
research that suggests that moral and aesthetic judgments 
are both produced by the same areas of the brain. And 
philosophers from both disciplines have examined the 
similarities and differences between moral and aesthetic 
value. The six essays in this volume seek to elucidate 
further areas in which the two disciplines overlap. 
 
John McAteer leads off the volume with his work, “How to 
be a Moral Taste Theorist.” Against the standard 
interpretation of Hume as a moral sense theorist—an 
interpretation arguably attributable to D. D. Raphael—
McAteer argues instead that he should be understood as a 
moral taste theorist. As used in this paper, moral sense 
theory holds that the moral sense is a special faculty of the 
mind, is instinctive, and is cognitive and/or affective but 
not conative. By contrast, moral taste theory holds that 
moral judgments are analogous to aesthetic judgments in 
that someone possessing good moral taste is capable of 
discerning moral beauty, and this requires no special 
mental faculties beyond those involved in aesthetic 
judgment. Further, moral taste is not instinctive, but can be 
acquired. And finally, the faculty of moral taste is both 
cognitive and conative. As McAteer notes, this last point 
has important implications for moral motivation. 
 
In “History and Moral Exempla in Enlightenment 
Aesthetics,” Bálint Gárdos similarly discusses the relation 
between the moral and the aesthetic during the 
Enlightenment, but in much broader terms. Agreeing with 
Paul Guyer that the rise of autonomous ethics cannot be 
attributed to the corresponding rise of the concept of 
disinterestedness, Gárdos seeks instead to attribute it to the 
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increasing abstractness of moral philosophy, which came to 
rely more on principles than on moral exempla. This shift 
ran parallel to a similar shift in the understanding of 
history, which moved away from the cataloging of exempla 
in the service of rhetoric. 
 
The next two pieces in the collection focus on the notion of 
disgust, a concept with both moral and aesthetic 
connotations. In “A Humean Approach to the Problem of 
Disgust and Aesthetic Appreciation,” Eva Dadlez addresses 
Hume’s notion of “emotional conversion,” in which 
emotions interact with and intensify one another, as a route 
to understanding how becoming aesthetically absorbed in 
an object can both depend upon and be intensified by 
disgust. Relying on different interpretations of conversion, 
Dadlez suggests that it be understood in terms of “tincture,” 
a term Hume also uses to describe the interplay between 
our emotions. Emotions can combine, blend, and affect one 
another in various ways, as Dadlez illustrates with passages 
from “The Vagina Monologues.” Through these examples, 
she demonstrates how the emotional response of disgust 
can enhance aesthetic appreciation. 
 
Carolyn Korsmeyer argues that the emotion of disgust has a 
“semantic connection” with mortality and death that makes 
disgust aesthetically relevant in our assessment of 
disgusting art. While not denying disgusting art’s aesthetic 
value, Filippo Contesi challenges Korsmeyer’s account of 
disgust in “The Meanings of Disgusting Art.” Specifically, 
he appeals to both counterexamples and a consideration of 
what it means to be the formal object of an emotion to 
show that disgust is about more than simply mortality and 
death. This recognition raises important avenues of future 
research on the notion of moral disgust. 
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In “Vandals or Visionaries? The Ethical Criticism of Street 
Art,” Mary Beth Willard seeks a proper model for how 
street art should be morally and aesthetically assessed. 
Rejecting both the ethicist and autonomist models of the 
aesthetic relevance of artworks’ moral content, Willard 
argues for a new model that takes seriously the interplay 
between street art and public spaces. This model is 
necessitated, she claims, because street art does not qualify 
as art in the sense that it is not part of the art world, as 
traditionally conceived. 
 
Polycarp Ikuenobe ends the collection with his “Good and 
Beautiful: A Moral-Aesthetic View of Personhood in 
African Communal Traditions.” Appealing to a variety of 
African cultures, Ikuenobe shows how the notion of 
community is essential to the African notion of 
personhood. From this, it follows that to be in harmony 
with one’s community is to be both good and beautiful. In 
sum, a consideration of the ontological status of the person 
in African culture reveals the centrality of both moral and 
aesthetic norms in the evaluation of the person. 
 
